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Below are two cases, Wounded Warrior Project and American Legacy Foundation, that focus on
similar issues. In both these cases a lack of governance and oversight led to misuse of funds and
fraud. These cases may be used together or individually. The sections on implications for theory
and policy, suggestions for classroom instruction, activities, discussion questions, and resources
apply to both cases. In addition, one may choose to zero in on either the governance issues, fraud
and financial oversight, or both of these topics.
What Went Wrong at the Wounded Warrior Project?
Ruth Bernstein, University of Washington Tacoma
Jeff Aulgur, Arkansas Tech University
The Wounded Warrior Project (WWP) is the largest veteran’s charity in the United
States. John Melia, a Somalia-wounded Marine veteran initiated, the Wounded Warrior Project
when he started giving backpacks full of items to returning Iraq war veterans in 2003. The WWP
projected was incorporated on February 23, 2005, for “the purposes of providing vital programs
and services to severely wounded service members and veterans to support their transition to
civilian life as well-adjusted citizens, both physically and mentally” (Internal Revenue Service,
2014, p. 2).
On March 9, 2016, the WWP board of directors terminated Chief Executive Officer Steve
Nardizzi and Chief Operations Officer Al Giordino. The termination of Nardizzi and Giordano
occurred after multiple news reports “highlighted lavish spending, including extravagant parties
and events, and cited dozens of former staff members describing a toxic leadership culture at the
popular veterans charity” (Cahn, 2016). Before the termination of its top two executives, the
organization vigorously defended itself against accusations of extravagant spending on staff
conferences and events, spending too little on programs for veterans, and too much on
fundraising (McCambridge, 2016).
Responding to the May 2016 findings of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s investigation
of the Wounded Warrior Project, whistleblower Erick Millette expressed his satisfaction: “It
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really validates Wounded Warrior Project’s claims that we’re not disgruntled employees,
because we’re not. . . We were just upset about the way money was spent, and we’re passionate
about those that have served our country” (Bauerlein, 2016). Millette and six other Wounded
Warrior Project employees went public in late 2015 with claims of lavish spending and the
wasting of donor funds.
John Melia hired Steven Nardizzi, who was head of the United Spinal Association, to join
the WWP. Soon, Nardizzi and Melia were fighting for control of the organization’s direction. In
2009, Melia resigned from the organization he created and Nardizzi became president. Nardizzi
envisioned an aggressive metric-driven organization modeled after corporate America: “I look at
companies like Starbucks - that’s the model. You're looking at companies that are getting it right,
treating their employees right, delivering great services and great products, then are growing the
brand to support all of that” (Phillips, 2016). Under Melia’s leadership, the organization
experienced incredible financial growth, as total revenues increased from $26.1 million in 2008
to $342 million in 2013. At the end of the 2013 fiscal year, the Wounded Warrior Project had
$22 million in cash on hand and $212 million invested in securities. Net assets now exceeded
$248 million.
In March 2016, following intense media scrutiny, the WWP board issued a statement
claiming an independent audit found the organization spent 81% of donations on programming.
The board also noted the use of joint cost allocation, common among nonprofits but disregarded
by organizations that monitor charity spending. Joint cost allocation is considered a Generally
Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP).
Table 1: WWP Revenue, Expenses, Assets and Fundraising Costs
Revenue

Expenses

Net Assets

Fundraising Cost
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Tax Year
2005
$ 1.0
$ 0.9
$ 3.0
$ 0.4
2006
$ 18.6
$ 15.6
$ 6.0
$ 2.0
2007
$ 21.5
$ 19.2
$ 8.2
$ 3.5
2008
$ 26.1
$ 26.6
$ 7.8
$ 6.2
2009
$ 40.9
$ 34.3
$ 14.6
$ 9.3
2010
$ 74.0
$ 57.7
$ 30.3
$ 13.8
2011
$ 154.9
$ 95.5
$ 90.2
$ 20.5
2012
$ 234.6
$ 158.1
$ 166.6
$ 31.7
2013
$ 342.0
$ 248.0
$ 248.2
$ 43.4
Note. Figures in $ millions. All data extracted from IRS Form 990 for each respective tax year.
After their termination, Nardizzi and Giordano asked the WWP board of directors to
release the report. However, in a written statement, the board indicated a written report did not
exist, and the investigators’ findings were given orally to the board and that such reviews
typically do not result in written reports.
In 2014, the WWP claimed it supported 398 veterans and their caregivers, assisted 302
veterans in gaining employment, and coordinated four-day cycling opportunities, known as
Soldier Rides, for an additional 156 veterans. In a reviewing of perceived criticisms of the
WWP, the Independent Voter Project stated that for an entity generating nearly $235 million in
revenue, “numbers like those seem curiously low. Still another question is raised by just how
some of the services that it [WWP] funded actually helped veterans recover from post-traumatic
stress or rehabilitate from combat-related wounds” (Schuette, 2014). A fourth of the $5.5
million in grants issued were utilized by receiving organizations for recreational activities, and
additional $5.7 million was spent producing the highly-visible Soldier Rides. Other grants
provided by the WWP included $300,000 for a parade, $50,000 for a monument, and $25,000
one nonprofit used to lobby and negotiate for postal rates for nonprofit organizations.
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Criticism emerged in 2014 from veterans’ advocates and veterans themselves, stating the
WWP is more concerned with image and public relations impact than it is the long-term wellbeing of those it claims to serve (Mak, 2014). A double-amputee who served in Iraq, on the
condition of anonymity, expressed not only a fear of retribution but disappointment: “They are
such a big name within the veterans’ community. I don’t need to start a war in my own backyard.
They’re more worried about putting their label on everything than getting down to brass tacks. It
is really frustrating.” The veteran, who survived an IED destroying his supply truck, continued,
“Everything they do is a dog-and-pony show, and I haven’t talked to one of my fellow veterans
that were injured. . . actually getting any help from the Wounded Warrior Project. I’m not just
talking about financial assistance; I’m talking about help, period” (Mak, 2014).
A significant part of the WWP’s revenue strategy is the result of branded partnerships,
and The Daily Beast noted this includes “everything from ketchup to paper towels to playing
cards - something that rubs other veterans’ groups the wrong way.” As stated by one alumni
member, “I receive more marketing stuff from them, [and see more of that] than the money
they’ve put into the community here in Arizona. It’s just about numbers and money to them.
Never once did I get the feeling that it’s about the veterans.” The same member said there were
times he could have used a ride to a Veterans Affairs medical facility. Instead of a ride he
received a “fleece beanie” (Mak, 2014).
In 2013, the WWP reported $189 million in program services expenses including $42
million in program grants to third-party organizations (Internal Revenue Service, 2013). Of the
$42 million in program services grants, the WWP included $28 million it transferred to the
newly-created Wounded Warrior Long-Term Trust. Excluding this transfer of cash, only 9% of
all program services expenses were direct grants to third-party organizations.
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Table 2: WWP Reported Program Expenditures and Grants (2013)
Expenses

Program
Grants

% Grants /
Expenses

Program
Alumni Association
Combat Stress Recovery
Physical Health & Wellness
Soldier Ride
Benefit Services
Track
Family Support Services
International Services
WWP Packs
Warriors to Work
Transition Training Academy
Peer Support
WWP Talk
Independence Program
Warriors Speak
Education Services
Wounded Warriors LT Trust

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

37,093,075
27,946,118
16,033,248
15,738,906
10,280,128
7,600,723
6,481,174
5,762,792
1,577,473
9,149,559
6,207,938
4,464,335
1,731,217
5,415,463
2,102,805
3,154,146
28,000,000

$ 4,700,682
$ 4,670,046
$
644,108
$
85,809
$
487,528
$
852,136
$
651,233
$
236,919
$
7,986
$
280,745
$
196,892
$
162,952
$
17,208
$
217,739
$
0
$
898,438
$ 28,000,000

12 %
17 %
4%
1%
5%
11 %
10 %
4%
1%
3%
3%
4%
1%
4%
0%
28 %
100 %

Total

$ 189,558,100

$ 42,100,421

22 %

Less WWP Long Term Trust
$ 161,558,100
$ 14,110,421
Note: Data extracted from the Wounded Warrior IRS Form 990 for FY 2013

9%

In December 2015, the WWP’s National Alumni Director, Ryan Kules, described upcoming
events for veterans across the United States to WWP staff members, which included (Mak,
2016):
•
•
•
•
•
•

Family members receiving haircuts and spa services (Minnesota)
25 veterans and family members attending A Christmas Carol (Alaska)
35 veterans will spend an evening bowling (Colorado)
20 veterans participate in a holiday Lego club night (Hawaii)
100 veterans and guest attend a winter wonderland (California)
Veterans attend a healthy holiday cooking class (Utah)
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The Wounded Warrior Project drew the attention of the Senate. U.S. Senator Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, asked interim CEO Anthony
Odierno to provide an account of spending not provided on IRS tax forms, including expenses
for travel, meetings, public relations, lobbying, and the Charity Defense Council. The WWP
cooperated with Sen. Grassley’s request. On August 10, 2016, the Senate Judiciary Committee
chairman’s staff met with the Wounded Warrior Project’s new CEO, retired Army Lieutenant
General Michael Linnington. The ongoing investigation includes the following (Gardner &
Wallace, 2016; Grassley, 2016).
•
•
•
•

33% of program services claimed by the WWP was free media and advertising.
The transfer of $37.1 million to the Wounded Warrior Long-Term Support Trust, which
the organization included as program expenses on behalf of veterans.
94% of program services to veterans in 2013 and 2014 consisted of tickets to sporting
events.
In 2014, of the $242 WWP spent on program expenses, approximately $150 million was
not devoted to veterans and a large portion of it was in-kind donations.

In June 2016, The WWP board of directors selected Michael S. Winnington, a decorated
veteran, retired Army Lieutenant General, and former employee of the Defense POW/MIA
Accounting Agency (DPAA), as the permanent CEO of the organization. Winnington inherited
a nonprofit organization experiencing the impact of negative public relations. By September
2016, the WWP reduced its workforce by 15 percent, over 600 employees, and it estimated lost
revenues of close to $100 million due to a 25% decrease in donations (Hrywna, September 1,
2016; Gardner, September 2, 2016). As the Wounded Warrior Project rehabilitates its image,
Linnigton indicated the need for an increased focus on veteran mental health concerns,
specifically post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries, while enhancing organizational
transparency and accountability (CBS News, September 1, 2016).
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THE LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN LEGACY FOUNDATION
Ruth Bernstein, University of Washington Tacoma
Fraud and embezzlement has moved beyond the corporate sector and infiltrated the
nonprofit sector! This was the outcome of an October, 26, 2013 Washington Post article
(Stephens and Flaherty, 2013), which found that between 2008 and 2012, greater than 1,000
nonprofit organizations revealed losses of hundreds of millions of dollars to theft, fraud,
embezzlement, and other illegal behaviors. This translates to nonprofit and religious
organizations experiencing one-sixth of all major embezzlements, second only to the financial
services industry. In 2014, over 1.6 million registered nonprofits had $.5 trillion in assets (not
including the estimated 700,000 churches and other organizations not required to file with the
IRS); this equates to approximately $100 billion a year in foregone tax revenue
(https://gbq.com/articles/fraud-report-roils-not-for-profit-sector/). Since 2008, nonprofit
organizations have been required to report diversions of more than $250,000 or those that exceed
5% of the annual gross on the Form 990 filed annually with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
This public disclosure enables the public to more easily evaluate how nonprofits handle their
finances. A list of nonprofits who have indicated on the Form 990 that they have diversions has
been compiled by GuideStar (a nonprofit watch-dog organization) and the Washington Post
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/nonprofit-diversions-database/).
One nonprofit on the diversion list was the American Legacy Foundation (Legacy), based
in Washington D.C. In 2011, in response to the question about diversion of funds on the IRS
Form 990, Legacy officials answered “yes,” but provided only a minimal explanation, stating
that they became aware of a diversion in excess of $250,000. Legacy officials indicated that the
diversion was due to fraud committed by a former employee. Only subsequently was it revealed
that the organization incurred an estimated $3.4 million loss.
7
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Introduction:
When the American Legacy Foundation (Legacy) officially opened its doors in 1999 it
already controlled $1 billion in assets emanating from the November 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement reached between attorneys general from 46 states, five U.S. territories and the
tobacco industry. Legacy’s mission was dedicated to building a world where young people reject
tobacco and anyone can quit. As noted on the now defunct Legacy website, the Foundation
developed programs that address the health effects of tobacco use, especially among vulnerable
populations disproportionately affected by the toll of tobacco, through grants, technical
assistance and training, partnerships, youth activism, and counter-marketing and grassroots
marketing campaigns. With revenues exceeding $320 million and $50 million in annual
expenditures (Stephens and Flaherty, 2013), Legacy set about fulfilling this mission by
publicizing the adverse effects of smoking through massive anti-tobacco campaigns. Perhaps the
most visible of these efforts was the so-called “Truth”-campaign and its controversial ads. For
example, during the 2000 Olympics, Legacy launched a broadcast showing individuals emptying
trucks of 1,200 body bags and dumping them outside the headquarters of Philip Morris in New
York, representing the number of Americans who die each day because of tobacco use. The
organization enjoyed early success when teen smoking started dropping, and Legacy was given
much of the credit.
On its website, Legacy informed the public that “being an honest and dependable source
of information is our bread and butter, because the minute we start bending and manipulating the
truth, we’re no better than the tobacco industry.” Moreover, the organization put together a highprofile board with significant political wallop including Idaho Attorney General Lawrence
Wasden (R), Missouri Governor Jay Nixon (D); Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert (R), and Iowa
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Attorney General Tom Miller (D), former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano, and Senator Thomas R. Carper (D-Del.) (Stephens and Flaherty, 2013).
Key Issue: Fraud
In 2011, after twelve years of being a celebrated nonprofit, the following statement was
found on Legacy’s tax form:
In fiscal year 2011, Legacy became aware of an unauthorized diversion of assets in
excess of $250,000 committed by a former employee…Foundation leadership notified
both its board of directors and law enforcement, with whom the Foundation has
cooperated fully in the ongoing investigation. A subsequent insurance claim was filed by
Legacy and in fiscal year 2012, was successfully settled.
The employee in question was computer specialist Deen Sanwoola. Hired in 1999 shortly
after Legacy began operations, Sanwoola was tasked with creating the IT department. Sanwoola
quickly became a highly appreciated employee and valued colleague, and over the years he
developed close personal ties to many of Legacy’s leaders, including CFO Anthony T. O’Toole.
“Everybody loved Deen,” O’Toole once acknowledged (Stephens and Flaherty, 2013).
The board acknowledged the importance of a strong IT apparatus in order for the organization to
fulfill its mission. Because the agency had strong finances from the very beginning, the board
was willing to allocate significant resources to the new IT department for computers, monitors
and software. Much of this equipment was purchased from a single Maryland company, Xclusiv.
Apparently, there was a lack of internal financial controls, because the board and Legacy
management granted Sanwoola the responsibilities for both ordering and recording the
purchasing of electronic equipment. From 1999 to 2007, Sanwoola generated as many as 255
invoices for computer equipment sold to the foundation before he decided to leave Legacy. In
2007, Sanwoola moved to Nigeria where he operated Fun City, a gaming and entertainment
center in Lagos. During his eight-years with Legacy, Sanwoola’s actions appear to not have
9

10

raised any red flags. He rose to the position of assistant vice president with a $180,000
compensation package, prior to the detection of the fraud.
In late 2007, an executive at Legacy approached the CFO Anthony O’Toole with
concerns regarding computers inventoried as purchased, but not in the Legacy offices. O’Toole,
a good friend of Sanwoola, whose compensation package totaled $568,000 in 2012, ignored the
complaint without investigating and failed to inform the CEO or the board. Three years later, the
same employee took his concerns to a staff person closer to the CEO Cheryl Haelton. Within
days after the second complaint, Legacy hired forensic examiners to investigate and Healton
notified the board. A concurrent internal investigation determined that fraud had indeed occurred
and determined the amount to be $3.4 million. Legacy board members notified the Washington
D.C. U.S. Attorney’s General Office.
The forensic audit detected the first signs of trouble starting almost immediately after
Sanwoola’s arrival in December 1999, when a computer processor and other equipment was
purchased for more than $18,000, yet the auditors concluded that it should have retailed for less
than half of that cost. Thereafter, both the number and size of purchases to the IT department
continued to rise, peaking with 49 expenses recorded in in 2006. The audit found that Legacy
often paid many times the market price, and in other cases made “phantom purchases” of
computer equipment that never arrived. Of the 255 invoices generated by Sanwoola, two thirds
of them were deemed to have been fraudulent, translating into $3.4 million.
Despite finding that millions of dollars were believed to be missing, the board and/or
management kept the affair internal until the 2011 annual disclosure (see above), singed by
O’Toole, which appears to downplay the total loss by only identifying a fraud of more than
$250,000. The disclosure also indicated that organization had filed an insurance claim that had
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been “successfully settled” but the board never said anything regarding the size of the settlement
nor whether it fell far short of the loss. Legacy commented that the absence of a total dollar
figure in its public filing was the Foundation’s way of being restrained in describing its loss, in
deference to the then-continuing federal investigation. Legacy general counsel, Ellen Vargyas,
reported to the Washington Post during their investigation, that the organization “had no
obligation to identify the full estimate of the loss” on the 2011 Form 990 or currently (Stephens
and Flaherty, 2013). Additionally, she stressed that more information was in the Foundation’s
2012 from 990 filing with the IRS. That filing included a reference to $1.3 million in
miscellaneous revenue from an insurance settlement. The day after declining to reveal the
amount of the loss to the Washington Post, Vargyas, wrote in an email, that the loss estimate was
$3,391,648.
The FBI visited Legacy in February of 2012, but, within weeks closed the investigation,
because, despite warnings, the leadership of Legacy had taken more than three years to report the
missing computers and lacked reliable records of what it owned. The U.S. Attorney’s General
Office for the district also suspended its case after citing that there would be not criminal
prosecution related to the fraud. Healton said she had expected the criminal case to clear the way
to recover its lost money. But now there also will be no civil lawsuit seeking repayment, because
as with the criminal case, the statute of limitations has passed.
On Oct. 30, 2012, O’Toole again signed a federal disclosure form for Legacy showing
that it received more than $1 million from an unspecified insurance settlement. Interestingly, the
form does not mention the $3.4 million loss. In a final comment to the Washington Post, CEO
Healton declared: “No excuses. It’s a terrible loss, and it shouldn’t have happened. If we lost
$3.4 million, that’s $3.4 million that did not go to save lives.”
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American Legacy Foundation Rises Again:
On September 8, 2015 Legacy changed its name to Truth Initiative (truthinitiative.org).
Truth Initiative continues work the work of the American Legacy Foundation, striving toward
“achieving a culture where all youth and young adults reject tobacco”. Truth Initiative
concentrates its efforts in three areas: 1) Truth® a national prevention counter-marketing
campaign; 2) the Schroeder Institute for Tobacco Research and Policy Studies which researches
effective means to reduce the harms of tobacco, measures effectiveness of interventions and
identifies best practices for tobacco control; and 3) working with community partners to counter
tobacco’s influence, especially within communities of color and low-income populations
(truthinitative.org).
Instructor/Trainer Guide
Context and Theoretical Background
The Wounded Warrior Project tragedy could potentially have been avoided by
understanding nonprofit governance in terms of separation between principals (board chair and
members) and agents (CEOs) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Governance issues such as CEO and board
relationships, board performance, leadership, and operations are frequently studied using two
principal-agent theories: agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jenson, 1983) and
stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Sundarmurthy & Lewis, 2001).
While both theories are based on a contractual relationship between principal and agent, with
agency theory, each actor has different goals and interests. The principal delegates control to the
agent yet is dependent on the agent to provide services and information on their behalf.
Unfortunately, the agent may not always act in ways that are beneficial to the principal creating
information asymmetries, agent opportunism, and goal conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to
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this theory, the perspectives of CEOs and the board members regarding effective governance
diverge because of the conflicting roles, goals and interests of principals and agents (Caers, Du
Bois, Jergers, Geiter, Schepers, & Pepermans, 2006). Caers et al. (2006) note that the application
of agency theory to board-management relationships is complex and may be influenced, among
other things, by weak or strong board control, CEO power, information asymmetry, and the
influence of the CEO on board elections and nominations. This divergence may have resulted in
the Wounded Warrior board members being distant from the CEO and contributed to a lack of
oversight of the CEO and other top leadership actions providing the opportunity for the agent to
commit fraud.
Possibly, the CEO and the board operated in separate environments, one where the CEO
that accommodates the complexity of overseeing the operation of the nonprofit organization and
another for the board members who are removed from the day-to-day operations and interact
primarily with other members of the board. Agency problems frequently occur in nonprofits
where a discrepancy between the objectives of those setting vision and those executing it exists
(Du Bois, Caers, Jegers, De Cooman, De Gieter, & Pepermans, 2009).
If the Wounded Warriors Project board and CEO had adopted a stewardship theory
approach the outcome may have been different. Stewardship theory, which also addresses the
principal-agent relationship, makes the assumption that collaboration and trust (rather than
control and distrust) exists between the principal (board members) and agent (executives) in part
because of their high identification with the organization. Stewardship theory may be viewed two
ways (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, and Jegers, 2012): (a) the agent will act in the best interest
of the principal even if their interests diverge because in doing so they will accomplish higher
personal outcomes of achievement, affiliation, and self-actualization (Davis et al., 1997) or (b)
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the principal’s and agent’s goals are in fact perfectly aligned because of commonality of interests
(Sundarmurthy and Lewis, 2003). In either case, stewardship theory suggests that the governance
perspectives of CEOs and the board will mostly overlap since they have compatible or aligned
goals. If the Wounded Warriors Project board and the top leadership were more in alignment, it
is unlikely that the top leadership would have felt that they had the right to abuse the
organization’s funds.
In the case of the Wounded Warriors Project, there was an apparent lack of knowledge by
the board of directors of the executive leadership behaviors. This disconnect may be explained
by (1) the failure of the board to educate themselves as to their roles and responsibilities,
individually and collectively, as board members, (2) information asymmetry, and (3) CEO power
(perceived or actual) over the board of directors. Scholarly and practitioner literature (e.g.
Axelrod, 1994; Miller, 2002; BoardSource) has converged on a set of suggested board member
roles and responsibilities. These responsibilities apply to both the individual board members and
the board as a collective. Included in these roles and responsibilities are the evaluation and
oversight of the CEO, the protection of assets, and the provision of financial control. The board
should have ensured that new members were informed of their roles and responsibilities during
the recruiting and orientation process.
Board members rely on the CEO to provide the information necessary to make informed
decisions and provide adequate organizational oversight. When the CEO holds back information,
this action challenges the board to uncover unknown discrepancies and issues. In the case of
miss-use of funds, board members should carefully examine the annual audit report and IRS
Form 990. These actions would have enabled the board members to question the fraudulent use
of the funds. During new board member orientation, the treasurer should teach those who are not
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familiar with reading financial documents how to do so. When an organization has a CEO that is
perceived as powerful and competent board members may become trusting and lazy with respect
to CEO oversight, which provides the CEO the opportunity for engaging in fraudulent behaviors.
Brown and Guo (2010) used CEO tenure as a proxy for CEO power and found that boards in
which CEOs have greater power were less likely to talk about their monitoring and oversight
functions. Finally, when CEOs have too much influence on selecting new board members, the
board may feel less able to confront the CEO on issues of concern.
Although it is important to make a distinction between the CEO and the board due to the
need to separate governance and management, CEO and board member behaviors often
contribute to ambiguity, confusion, and conflict (Otto, 2003). Nonprofit board members tend to
believe that their CEOs will not pursue interests of their own and act in ways aligned with the
organizational mission in support of stewardship theory. According to agency theory, the
possibility exists that the agent or CEO has his or her personal agenda and acts independently of
the board. This independence may be exacerbated when the board provides weak CEO control
and oversight (Miller, 2002). Conversely, boards that exert too much control or power may lead
to misperceptions and distrust between the board and the CEO. The notion that the board is
solely responsible for organizational governance may be too narrow and needs to be replaced
with the idea that governance is a set of responsibilities and actions that emerges from multiple
actors (Stone and Ostrower, 2007). This may result in a blurring of board and CEO boundaries
contrary to the delineation of nonprofit governance regarding of agency theory and the
separation between the principals and the agents.
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Suggestions For Classroom Instruction
The Wounded Warrior Project and American Legacy Foundation fiascos provides two
primary teaching opportunities: governance and fraud. Governance issues of particular relevance
are the lack of governance of the organization by the board of directors due to a failure to
understand board member fiduciary duties and a poor understanding of individual and collective
board member roles and responsibilities. The second topic focuses on fraud and the board
member’s lack of financial literacy. Included in this discussion is the need for internal and
external controls.
Governance: The role of the board of directors is to provide governance for the organization.
While many definitions of governance exist, a recent one from Cornforth and Brown (2014)
states that “the systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control, and
accountability of the organization” (4-5). Activity #1 (below) focuses on the fiduciary duties of
board members. A clear understanding of the fiduciary responsibilities may have encouraged the
WWP and ALF board members to engage in CEO and financial oversight, and voice concerns
when needed.
Scholarly journals (e.g., Axelrod, 1994; Miller, 2002; Bernstein, Buse, and Slatten, 2015)
and the practitioner literature (e.g., BoardSource) identify suggested roles and responsibilities for
board members individually and collectively (see activity #2). The significance of board
members’ understanding of their unique and distinct roles and responsibilities implies that
deliberate action must be taking place to explain and identify the nature of these functions.
Specific practices, such as board orientation and board training, have been identified as
contributing factors leading to high-quality board performance and organizational performance
(Herman & Renz, 2000).
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Governance models: Once students understand the board’s fiduciary duties and their roles and
responsibilities, the stage is then set for a more advanced analysis of governance models and
principal-agent theories. Carver’s Policy Governance Model (2006), which is a board-centered
model of governance based on assumptions of separation of between the CEO and the board of
directors. In this model a clear line is drawn between the board’s responsibility for policymaking (as the “moral owners” of the organizations) and the executive’s responsibility for
implementation and day-to-day operations. The board’s role is to establish stewardship through
vision, mission, values, strategic planning, secure resources, defining clear roles and
responsibilities, overseeing the articulation and documentation of board policies, and
accountability to the stakeholders for organizational direction and performance.
A second governance model is Chait, Ryan, and Taylor’s (2005) Governance-asLeadership model that supposes the board is reactive to staff initiatives. Instead of focusing on
organizational vision, the board is so mired in managerial details and routine technical work, that
they are effectively managing, while the CEO is articulating the visions beliefs, values, and
cultures of the organization. The Governance-as-Leadership model is predicated on the board
operating in the fiduciary (oversight), strategic (foresight), and generative (insight) modes of
governance simultaneously. This model forces the board and CEO to work closely together on
“what matters most”.
The third governance model is based on the philosophy of “psychological centrality”
(Herman & Heimovics, 2005), with the CEO leading the organization, but using a boardcentered leadership style, designed to support the board in meeting its governance
responsibilities. In other words, the CEO is seen as responsible for the organization’s success or
failure by taking a role that ensures “that the board fulfills their legal, organizational, and public
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roles” (p. 156). However, this does not imply that the CEO holds more formal responsibility or
authority than the board, but that the CEO is perceived as responsible, even by members of the
board. Herman and Heimovics conclude that CEOs who have developed these board-centered
leadership skills are effective in their roles and also have hardworking, effective boards.
Governance theories: While there are a number of governance theories, the principal– agent
theories are most relevant to this case. A presentation of both agency and stewardship theory and
their application to this case highlights the ease in which rogue CEOs may act independently of
the board and potentially destroy the organization (see above section on Context and Theoretical
Background).
Fraud and Financial Literacy: The Wounded Warrior Project and the Amercian Legacy
Foundation cases highlight the need for board and organizational fiscal responsibility. The board
must, according to the duty of care, provide financial oversight and protect the organization’s
assets and reduce the potential for fraud. Amazingly, nonprofit board members often lack even a
modicum of financial literacy. Board members should include the ability to read the essential
financial documents, including the Statement of Cash Flow, Income Statement or Statement of
Activities, Statement of Financial Position or Balance Sheet, Budgets (including the Cash
Budget), and Variance Reports. The Board Treasurer or the organization’s Chief Financial
Officer should take responsibility for educating board members who lack basic financial literacy
skills. With $40 billion lost to fraud annually in the nonprofit sector (Harvard University Hauser
Center, n.d.), students should explore the fraud triangle (http://www.acfe.com/fraud-101.aspx).
Activity #3, below, focuses on the fraud triangle, which highlights how fraud occurs when
individuals experience financial pressures, can rationalize the act, and have an opportunity.
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Internal controls: A nonprofit organization’s first line of defense against fraud is the
establishment of internal controls. You may choose to have the students watch in class or as
assignment the following videos, Once Upon an Internal Control ( U-tube (2 parts):
www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qeibzgSemY and www.youtube.com/watch?v=7KESsI04-XY. The
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) divided internal controls into five components:
control environment, risk assessment, internal control activities, information and communication,
and monitoring. (http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO%20McNallyTransition%20ArticleFinal%20COSO%20Version%20Proof_5-31-13.pdf)
Control Environment
1. Demonstrate commitment to integrity and
ethical values
2. Exercise oversight responsibility
3. Establish structure, authority, and
responsibility
4. Demonstrate commitment to competence
5. Enforce accountability
Risk Assessment
6. Specify suitable objectives
7. Identify and analyze risk
8. Assess fraud risk
9. Identify and analyze significant change

Internal Control Activities
10. Select and develop control activities
11. Select and develop general controls over
technology
12. Deploy through policies and procedures
Information & Communication
13. Use relevant information
14. Communicate internally
15. Communicate externally
Monitoring
16. Conduct ongoing and/or separate
evaluations
17. Evaluate and communicate deficiencies

The idea behind all of the above policies, practices, and procedures employed by an organization
is to achieve the following four objectives:
1.
2.
3.
4.

To safeguard assets of the firm
To ensure accuracy and reliability of accounting records and information
To promote efficiency of the firm’s operations
To measure compliance with management’s prescribed policies and procedures
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Discussion Questions
1. What happened? Was there dishonesty present—embezzlement, theft, diversion of funds,
nepotism, partiality, abuse of trust, lying, self-serving misspending, or just plain
incompetence?
2. Now that the organization has been exposed for fraudulent behavior, where did the
“fault” lie? Is it with the staff, CEO, Board, funders, or other individuals or groups? Or
was the “fault” embedded in the very structure and set-up of the organization as a whole?
Was it due to a failure of imagination, planning, implementation, management,
leadership, or accountability? Was there more than one kind of fault apparent or were
different faults the responsibility of different actors?
3. What is the responsibility of the board of directors in this fraud? What actions should the
board now take? What actions can the board take to prevent this type of fraud from
happening again in the future? At what stage in the case might intervention have saved
things? Who should have identified the problems.
4. What legal duties do board members need to abide by? How would knowledge of these
duties potentially have eliminated the opportunity for fraud?
5. What are the board member roles and responsibilities, both individually and collectively?
How would knowing these have potentially avoided the fraud?
6. What are internal controls and how could they have been utilized to prevent fraud in this
case?
7. The IRS may levy intermediate sanctions against board members. What are these
sanctions? When can they be levied? Do you think that the board members should have
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received these sanctions? What should external regulatory authorities have done? Do
laws and processes that apply to the nonprofit sector need reforming in light of this case?
8. Many other nonprofit organizations have had serious public relations issues and have
been investigated by Senator Grassley and continued to raise money and serve their
mission. An example is the American Red Cross. Do you think that the WWP and ALF
will survive?
Questions particular to the WWP:
1. At the time the Wounded Warrior Project crisis was exposed, reporters noted that the
organization had $250 million in reserves. The 2014 budget was $330 million. Do you
agree or disagree with the reporters that having this amount in reserves is problematic?
Why or why not? How much reserves are recommended for nonprofit organizations?
Why do you think this amount is suggested?
2. What does this case teach us about the power dynamics that existed in the WWP or
between the board of directors and the senior leadership prior to March 9, 2016? A
follow-up question would be, who, in the WWP, uses power to influence the governance
process and how was it deployed? Were there an obvious power struggle between the
CEO and the Board of Directors?
Student/Training Participant Activities
Activity #1 Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience: Tell the story of the Sibley Hospital
Case (for example, Worth, 2014, p. 78-79). Introduce the Duties of Care, Loyalty, and
Obedience. Write on the board each of the three board duties and ask the students to identify,
from the list below (taken from Worth, 2014), which activities are associated with each of the
three duties.
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•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Paying attention
Complying with the law (federal,
state and local)
Exercising due diligence in
monitoring the organization’s
finances
Board members not using their board
position to enhance their own
business or personal interests
Exercising common sense and not
loose organizational assets due to
recklessness, indifference, or failure
to seek appropriate advice
Decisions made are consistent with
the organization’s mission
Attending board meetings
Assuring that business done with
board member’s companies are paid

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

appropriately for the goods and
services received
The organization’s founding
documents and charter drive
decision-making
Reading board materials
Not accepting unreasonable benefit
from the organization’s funds
The by-laws of the organization are
abided by
Not using organization funds to pay
unreasonable amounts to other board
members or executives
Making independent decisions
Putting the organization above self
Voting without understanding the
issues

Activity #2 Board Roles and Responsibilities: Ask the students to identify what they think are
the roles and responsibilities of an individual board member. Record the responses on the board.
Ask students to identify the collective roles and responsibilities of the board. Record these
responses. Prompt the students to identify the accepted responsibilities (BoardSource.org;
Bernstein, Buse, & Slatten, 2015). Compare where these two lists differ and overlap. Use this
discussion to highlight the significance of board training.
Activity #3 The Fraud Triangle: Present the Fraud Triangle, below
(http://www.acfe.com/fraud-101.aspx). Define fraud (for example: the intentional deception,
misappropriation of assets, manipulation of financial information with the intent to deceive).
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1. Give students time to look at the following website, which highlights the ten worst cases
of fraud http://www.accounting-degree.org/scandals/.
2. Present the following concepts:
a. Fraudulent Statements – misstating financial statements in a way that benefits
the perpetrator
b. Corruption – an executive, manager or employee in collusion with an outsider
(bribery, illegal gratuity, conflicts of interest, extortion)
c. Asset Misappropriation – assets diverted in a way that benefits the perpetrator
3. Ask students to identify the types of misappropriation (for example: skimming, cash
larceny, credit card abuse, fictitious vendor schemes, check tampering, theft of cash,
payroll schemes, expense reimbursement, conflicts of interest and misappropriation of
non-cash assets).
4. Brainstorm the pressures that promote fraud (such as drug, gambling or shopping
additions, outstanding loans or other debts, marital affairs (for example the United Way
scandal, see Glaser, 1994), declining revenues, etc.)
5. Examining fraud may create the opportunity for a lively discussion as students begin to
think about situations they have personally experienced where they resisted the
temptation to engage in fraud and the frequency of such opportunitites.
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Activity #4 Internal Controls: It is 2014 and you are the board chair of WWP or ALF. The
board had voted to keep $1,000 in cash in the office to meet incidental cash requirements of
under $100 per incident. An example would be to provide cash for a quick trip to Office Depot to
get computer paper. You know that you need to implement internal controls on the cash so that it
is not misappropriated. Watch the video on the separation of duties.
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOSVTdw7Qbg). For each of the internal controls listed
below, describe what measures you would put in place to protect the cash.
1. Establish responsibilities
2. Maintain adequate records
3. Double signature, authorizations and
back-up documents
4. Supervision
5. Segregation of duties
6. Control access
7. Independent Verification of
processes and records

8. Fixed Asset Inventories
9. Automated controls
10. Background checks
11. Audits and board-level oversight
12. Encourage whistleblowers
13. Strong compliance program
14. Self-audits

Activity #5 Internal Controls: Read and discuss the Nonprofit Quarterly article by Rick Cohen
(https://www.charities.org/news/washington-post-piece-gives-misimpression-nonprofit-worldrife-fraud). This article puts a different perspective on the Washington Post Investigation into
fraud within the nonprofit sector.
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